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RIPSTEIN, RAWLS, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Stephen Perry*
Arthur Ripstein's article, The Division of Responsibility and the
Law of Tort,' is primarily concerned with an age-old but nonetheless
perennially intriguing question, which is, what is the proper
relationship between corrective and distributive justice? The answer
he offers to that question is complex and subtle, and while it is
advanced within a Rawlsian framework, it does not represent Rawls's
own explicit position. As Ripstein notes, Rawls does not address this
subject in any detail. Rawls maintains that corrective justice-the
justice of interpersonal transactions-presupposes a just distribution,2
and also that it has a certain independence from distributive justice.3
There are well known difficulties with reconciling these two claims,'
and Rawls himself says little to show how the required reconciliation
can be achieved. Ripstein's very interesting suggestion is that the
solution to this problem is implicit in Rawls's notion of a "social
division of responsibility."5 In this Essay, I want very briefly to sketch
Ripstein's proposal and offer a couple of preliminary observations
about its viability.
Ripstein argues that the deeper Rawlsian solution to the
corrective/distributive problem cannot be regarded as having its roots
in the methodology of the original position. This is so for two reasons.
The first is the fairly straightforward point that the original position is
an expository device, so that we can only get out of it what we have
already put in. The second and more serious reason, however, builds
on Thomas Pogge's argument that the methodology of the
hypothetical contract is unavoidably consequentialist and aggregative
in character.6 This is because the parties in the original position are
choosing principles that govern very general and pervasive
* Fiorello La Guardia Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, New York
University School of Law.
1. Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72
Fordham Law Review 1811 (2004).
2. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 9-10 (rev. ed. 1999); John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 266 (1993).
3. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 266-69.
4. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive
Justice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th Series 239 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
5. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Utilitarianism and Beyond
159, 165 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
6. Thomas Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of
Assessing Social Institutions, 12 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 241 (1995).
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institutional arrangements-the basic structure of society, in Rawls's
phrase-and in doing so they focus exclusively on outcomes rather
than on, say, individual actions: "[T]he problem with the contract
argument is that the parties in the original position attach value only
to states of affairs."7 It is, however, individual actions, rather than
states of affairs, that comprise the domain of corrective justice.
Beyond that, the structure of corrective justice and tort law is, as
Ripstein correctly observes, deontological in nature: It assumes that
there are universal obligations, in the form of constraints on action,
which every individual owes to every other individual. The
hypothetical contract does not offer a promising foundation for
explaining this structure because in the original position "the
distinction between harms that I suffer in general and those harms
that are brought about through the wrongdoing of others is invisible."8
Ripstein thinks that Rawls's arguments for his two principles of justice
nonetheless survive this criticism of the methodology of the original
position, thereby deflecting challenges from libertarianism,
utilitarianism, and skeptical egalitarianism, because those arguments
are ultimately grounded in Rawls's conception of the person rather
than in the hypothetical contract as such. That conception supposes
that moral persons are moved by two highest-order moral interests,
which are the interests such persons have in realizing and exercising
the two capacities of moral personality. Those capacities are, in turn,
"the capacity for a sense of right and justice.., and the capacity to
decide upon, to revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the
good."9
Ripstein argues that the independence of corrective from
distributive justice can likewise be established within a Rawlsian
framework without appeal to the hypothetical contract or the original
position. As a practical matter, "independence" here means the
establishment of institutions of tort law, and of private law generally,
which assess interactions between persons in their own terms, and
thus without direct reference to background distributive concerns.
Ripstein's starting-point in defending this claim about independence
is, as was noted earlier, Rawls's "division of social responsibility"
between society and the individual. Rawls maintains that once we
have all been provided with a just and adequate share of primary
7. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1823. The argument is reminiscent of Ernest
Weinrib's criticisms of Charles Fried's early attempt to defend a Kantian
interpretation of tort law. Fried attempted to ground that interpretation in a "risk
pool" that was viewed from the perspective of a contractarian original position. See
Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice 61-
66, 183-200 (1970). Weinrib argued, among other things, that such an approach
"would lack the required structure of corrective justice." Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a
Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law & Phil. 37, 46, 56 (1983).
8. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1823.
9. Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, supra note 5, at 164-65.
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goods, we each have a special responsibility to make what we will of
our own lives within the constraints set by the two principles of
justice.1" Ripstein suggests, plausibly enough, that this division of
responsibility entails that we may not demand more than our fair
share of resources if we make a choice that we come to regret, nor is it
up to society to choose a conception of the good on our behalf." Each
individual uses his fair share of primary goods to choose and pursue a
conception of the good for himself; each uses those goods, in other
words, to exercise the second moral power.
The crucial step in Ripstein's argument is the claim that there is a
further dimension to the Rawlsian division of responsibility. The
special responsibility of moral persons extends, he argues, beyond the
relationship between individuals and society to encompass relations
among individuals themselves. It is, on Ripstein's view, this extension
of the notion of special responsibility that grounds both the
independence of corrective justice and its deontological content. The
special responsibility we each have for our own lives would be
seriously undermined, he suggests, if individuals were allowed to
displace some of the costs of their own life-plans onto others. 2 If
someone wrongs me by using what is mine without my consent, she
violates my special responsibility for my own life "by making use of
powers or goods that are mine in pursuit of something that is not part
of my conception of the good."' 3 If she wrongs me by damaging some
of my resources as a by-product of her own activities, "[she]
interfere[s] with my ability to take responsibility for my own life...
[by depriving] me of the means I [previously] had to do so."' 4 One of
the appropriate institutional responses to either type of wrong-there
may be others, such as criminal punishment-is the paradigmatic tort
remedy of an award of damages, the purpose of which is to make the
victim whole. The imposition of such a remedy will, of course, change
the pattern of holdings in society, but Ripstein argues that the change
is acceptable from a Rawlsian point of view precisely because it is
traceable to the special responsibility of the wrongdoer. 5 Rawlsian
distributive justice calls for certain institutional arrangements, such as
10. See id.
[S]ociety, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for
maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for
providing a fair share of the other primary goods for everyone within this
framework, while citizens (as individuals) and associations accept the
responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of
the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable
situation.
Id. at 170.
11. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1831.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1833.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1840-41.
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progressive taxation, rather than for a specific pattern of holdings.
Part of the reason for adopting an institutional approach is to allow
for changes in holdings that result from the choices of individuals, and
the changes that are associated with the rectification of a wrong are
appropriately viewed as flowing from just such a choice. a6 Ripstein
puts the point by saying that if I wrong you and I have to pay damages
as a result, "[i]t is as though I had injured myself, or damaged my own
property.' 17
This is a very interesting argument, and I believe that it contains an
important kernel of truth about the relationship between corrective
and distributive justice. But I also believe the argument cannot bear
the entire weight of the conclusions that Ripstein hopes to derive from
it. My discussion, which will inevitably be too brief to do justice to
Ripstein's rich and subtle development of Rawlsian themes, will focus
on two related issues. The first concerns the methodology that is
presupposed by Ripstein's argument. The second concerns the range
and character of the possible social arrangements that the underlying
methodology would recognize as permissible.
Let me discuss the methodological issue first. As was noted above,
Ripstein accepts Pogge's argument that the reasoning of parties in the
original position will inevitably be consequentialist in character,
because the parties are concerned with the assessment of states of
affairs rather than with the assessment of individual actions. I agree
with Ripstein that Pogge's argument is compelling and, consequently,
also agree that the deontological content of tort law cannot be derived
from the methodology of the hypothetical contract. But this rejection
of Rawls's own preferred methodology very quickly leads us to ask
what methodology underlies Ripstein's Rawls-inspired argument from
the division of responsibility. Ripstein is clearly emphasizing and
relying upon the Kantian strand in Rawls's thinking. But if we are not
simply to turn Rawls into Kant there must presumably be something
distinctively Rawlsian about the argument. Kant's own methodology
for establishing first-order moral conclusions is essentially conceptual
in character, and it makes strong metaphysical assumptions about
noumenal selves. Rawls introduced the notion of the original position
precisely in order to avoid these aspects of Kant's approach:
The original position may be viewed, then, as a procedural
interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical
imperative within the 'framework of an empirical theory. The
principles regulative of the kingdom of ends are those that would be
chosen in this position, and the description of this situation enables
us to explain the sense in which acting from these principles
16. Elsewhere I have defended essentially the same view of how it is that
corrective justice can change the pattern of holdings without affecting the justice of
those holdings. See Perry, supra note 4, at 253-63.
1 17. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1841.
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expresses our nature as free and equal rational persons. No longer
are these notions purely transcendent and lacking explicable
connections with human conduct, for the procedural conception of
the original position allows us to make these ties. 8
As this and many other passages in both Rawls's early and later
work make abundantly clear, the ultimate foundation for his theory of
justice is his conception of the person as free and equal. The equality
of persons is embodied in the capacity for a sense of right and justice,
while freedom is embodied in the capacity to decide upon, to revise,
and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. It is important to
note that in the quoted passage Rawls recasts the categorical
imperative "within the framework of an empirical theory."19 This is a
point to which I shall return shortly. It is also important to remember
that Rawls characterizes his conception of the person in terms of two
highest-order interests that individuals have in exercising their two
moral powers.2 0  Any distinctively Rawlsian methodology must
preserve this feature, and Ripstein's argument does, in fact, preserve
it. For example, he endorses Rawls's conclusion that the rules
governing individual transactions between persons must include rules
permitting contracts.21 Ripstein characterizes the two main premises
that support this conclusion as follows. First, "[m]y interest in having
both my own powers... is an interest in having those things at my
disposal, that is, to have them available to me, so as to pursue and
revise my own conception of the good. '22 Second, "[t]he power to
enter into contracts makes distributive shares valuable to people in
pursuing their own conceptions of the good. 23  It is this idea of
making fair shares of primary goods valuable for purposes of
choosing, revising and pursuing a conception of the good that is key.
This idea must of course be given effect within a context of equality.
Rawlsian persons do not want as much freedom as possible. Rather
they want "as much freedom to set and pursue [their] own conception
of the good as [they] can have in a way that is consistent with others
having the same. "24 Still, the core of the argument is the idea that
"[d]istributive shares are important because they enable choice[;]...
they are the things wanted by parties concerned to protect their own
ability to decide for themselves how to live their lives."25
There are two main points to note about the methodology of
Ripstein's argument, as thus construed. The first is that it preserves
18. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2, at 226.
19. Id.
20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 265-69.
22. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1837.
23. Id. at 1838.
24. Id. at 1832.
25. Id. at 1834.
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the empirical character of Rawls's recasting of the categorical
imperative. I will speak of the means for "enabling choice," to use
Ripstein's convenient phrase, as shorthand to refer to the means for
protecting the ability to decide for oneself how to live one's life. It is
clear that different social arrangements can enable choice in different
degrees, so that the preferable set of arrangements is the one that
enables choice to the greatest degree that is consistent with equal
enablement for all. But the determination of which set of
arrangements that might be is an empirical question. At times
Ripstein's argument from the division of social responsibility seems to
be an almost purely conceptual argument about what it means to
"have" one's fair share of resources, as when, for example, he
maintains that "I only have things as my own to use in forming,
pursuing and revising my conception of the good inasmuch [as] others
are under an obligation to avoid interfering with them."26  This
proposition is undoubtedly true, but its truth is consistent with many
different conceptions of what the obligations of others are, and the
determination of which conception is optimal from the perspective of
equal enablement of choice is clearly an empirical matter. Even more
importantly, Ripstein is only in a position to make the conceptual
claim because he implicitly assumes (along with Rawls) that "having
one's share" is to be understood by reference to what Honor6 calls
"the 'liberal' concept of 'full' individual ownership."27 This means,
more particularly, that individuals have both a liberty to use and a
right to exclusive possession. Once we have a right to exclusive
possession then of course it follows as a conceptual matter that others
are under a correlative duty. But what is minimally required to set
and pursue a conception of the good is simply access to resources, i.e.,
a liberty to use resources. The argument that persons should also
have a right to exclusive possession must be that the recognition of
such a right will improve their (equal) capacity to set and pursue a
conception of the good, as compared to a mere liberty to use.2" This is
a plausible enough claim, but the important point for present purposes
is that it is empirical in nature. More generally, the meaning of
"having one's fair share" must be determined at every point by an
empirical inquiry into the optimal means for enabling choice in the
requisite sense.
26. Id. at 1840.
27. A.M. Honord, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 1st Series 107,
107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
28. Ripstein does not discuss the concept of property in any detail in The Division
of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, but he says more elsewhere. See Arthur
Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 2, 11-12 (2004). He argues
there that the concept of "secure title" involves both possession and use, and that
"[s]ecure title in things is prerequisite to the capacity to both set and pursue ends." Id.
at 12. For the reasons given in the text, this is too strong a claim.
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The second point to be observed about Ripstein's methodology is
that it must be characterized as consequentialist in character. The key
element of his argument concerns the choice of institutional
arrangements that will best advance an individual interest, namely, the
interest that moral persons have in the exercise of their capacity to set
and pursue a conception of the good. The choice among different
institutional arrangements is simply a choice among different states of
affairs, and it is thus consequentialist in precisely the sense that
Ripstein recognizes in accepting Pogge's criticism of the methodology
of the original position. It is true that Ripstein concludes that the
optimal social arrangement will be one that incorporates distinct
institutions to regulate redistribution on the one hand and interaction
among individuals on the other, but this conclusion must ultimately
depend on an empirical determination that such an arrangement best
advances the interest that Rawlsian persons have in enabling choice.
The content of the conclusion does not call into question the
consequentialist character of the argument that must be advanced to
support it. It is also true that the supporting argument must respect
the equality of persons, but this point too is completely consistent with
the argument's consequentialist character. After all, Rawls's purpose
in introducing the idea of the original position was simply to make
perspicuous the constraints that equality places on the choice of
principles that are to regulate the basic structure; as Ripstein
observes, the original position is at bottom an expository device.
Ripstein's argument from the division of responsibility does not
employ that device. But, because the argument makes a case for one
institutional arrangement over others on the grounds that a particular
interest that all persons have will be optimally advanced under
conditions of equality, it is fundamentally similar to arguments that
do. If you are a Rawlsian, it is not as easy as all that to escape from
the original position.
This brings me to the second of the two related issues that
Ripstein's argument from the division of responsibility raises. This
issue, which follows naturally from the methodological questions that
have just been considered, concerns the range and character of the
possible institutional arrangements that the methodology of Ripstein's
argument would recognize as permissible. In light of the discussion in
the preceding two paragraphs, a fundamental premise of the argument
must be the empirical claim that recognizing and enforcing
interpersonal rights and obligations having a strong deontological
content will not only advance the interest that Rawlsian persons have
in enabling choice, but it will do so better than any other possible
institutional arrangements. Perhaps this claim is true. But, because it
is an empirical claim, it is perfectly conceivable that other institutional
arrangements, which either recognize interpersonal rights and
obligations that deviate from the content of traditional deontology or
2004] 1851
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which do not draw a strict line between corrective and distributive
justice, might be justified instead. It is important not to be misled
here by Ripstein's dual use of the term "responsibility."
"Responsibility" for how one's life goes is not the same as
"responsibility" for (certain of) the effects that one's actions have on
others. For anyone with deontological sympathies it is of course
natural to think that there is responsibility of the latter kind. But I
take Ripstein to be arguing that deontological rights and obligations
can be derived from the special responsibility that Rawlsian persons
have for how their own life goes. For the reasons that were examined
earlier, the derivation must depend on the empirical-and hence
contingent-claim just described. There is thus nothing inevitable
about the conclusions Ripstein reaches regarding the content and
independence of corrective justice. Given the consequentialist
character of the argument, it must in the end be regarded as
essentially a coincidence that the rights and obligations to which it
points happen to be coextensive with those recognized by traditional
deontological theory.
Let me illustrate the point of the preceding paragraph with some
concrete examples. As I remarked earlier, once the idea of "having
one's fair share" is understood in terms of the liberal conception of
full individual ownership, it follows as a conceptual matter that others
are under a duty to respect my right to exclusive possession. This is
the kernel of truth in Ripstein's argument from the division of
responsibility. But, as I also remarked earlier, a Rawlsian defense of
the conclusion that distributive justice should be understood by
reference to full individual ownership must rest on the empirical
assumption that this is the best way to advance the interest that
Rawlsian persons have in enabling choice. Even when reciprocal
duties to respect others' right to exclusive possession of their shares
have been recognized, however, there is no reason why the duties that
individuals owe to one another should be limited to the negative
duties of traditional deontological theory. Consider, for example,
Ripstein's discussion of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. He
argues that because free and equal persons "can only be interested in
shares of primary goods if they have them in the requisite sense,"29
they cannot be under any obligation to confer benefits on one
another, no matter how significant the benefit or how easy it might be
to confer it. "Such an obligation would undermine the sense in which
what they have is their own."3 But why should this be? While the
argument has a conceptual flavor, there is no reason why the idea of
having one's share should be undermined by, say, a duty of easy
29. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1839.
30. Id. at 1840.
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rescue.31 The claim must rather be psychological, and therefore
empirical, in character. Understood in that way, however, it is not
particularly plausible. Moreover, this does not even seem to be the
right kind of argument. As we saw earlier, on a Rawlsian approach
the appropriate conception of fair shares must be spelled out at every
point by reference to empirical claims about what set of institutional
arrangements best advances the interest in enabling choice. If, as
might well be the case, that interest would be better served by a
general duty of easy rescue than by a regime of pure negative duties,32
then the conceptual contours of "having one's share" are determined
accordingly. There is no independent conception of that notion that is
available to be undermined.
The example of the preceding paragraph showed that the
interpersonal rights and obligations that could permissibly be justified
under the methodology of Ripstein's argument might not coincide
with the content of traditional deontological theory. Consider next a
set of examples that shows how the line between institutions of
corrective and of distributive justice might be blurred. Assume that
distributive shares are properly defined by reference to the liberal
conception of full individual ownership; individuals thus have a duty
to respect one another's rights of exclusive possession. Perhaps the
existence of a right of exclusive possession conceptually entails the
existence of a right to be compensated by someone who violates the
primary right; I express no view on that issue here. However, even if
there is such a conceptual entailment, it does not follow that there
cannot be public rights of compensation that might supplement or
even replace individuals' private remedial rights. Consider victim
compensation schemes, workers' compensation plans, or a general
New Zealand-style compensation program. All of these involve
compulsory redistribution to provide compensation for private
wrongs. All could in principle be justified under the methodology of
Ripstein's argument from the division of responsibility. From a
Rawlsian perspective, the superiority of one such institutional
arrangement over others depends entirely on whether that
arrangement best advances the interest in enabling choice under
conditions of equality.
31. This is true, it should be noted, even if the duty extends beyond dangers to the
person so as to apply to at least some cases of danger to property.
32. It is sometimes argued that a duty of easy rescue cannot be justified because
there is no principled basis for limiting the duty to situations where one could rescue
another with little or no danger or inconvenience to oneself. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 190 (1973). This objection
has some force within traditional deontological theory, but it has no purchase against
a Rawlsian argument for a duty of easy rescue. This is because the existence and
scope of the duty depend entirely on the degree to which it advances the interest in
enabling choice, and a duty of easy rescue might well be superior in this respect to a
more onerous duty.
2004] 1853
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As I noted at the beginning of this Essay, Rawls does not say a great
deal about the relationship between corrective and distributive justice.
It is nonetheless striking to observe that the arguments he does offer
in support of the independence of the two forms of justice have
exactly the pragmatic, consequentialist character that our earlier
discussion of methodology would lead us to expect. Rawls appears to
take corrective justice as a given, and then argues that because
background (i.e., distributive) justice will be eroded "even when
individuals act fairly," "we require special institutions to preserve
background justice."33 He discusses the reason why we require special
institutions in the following passage:
[T]here are no feasible and practicable rules that it is sensible to
impose on individuals that can prevent the erosion of background
justice. This is because the rules governing agreements and
individual transactions cannot be too complex, or require too much
information to be correctly applied; nor should they enjoin
individuals to engage in bargaining with many widely scattered third
parties, since this would impose excessive transaction costs. The
rules applying to agreements are, after all, practical and public
directives, and not mathematical functions which may be as
complicated as one can imagine. Thus any sensible scheme of rules
will not exceed the capacity of individuals to grasp and follow them
with sufficient ease, nor will it burden citizens with requirements of
knowledge and foresight that they cannot normally meet.34
Rawls apparently does not think that there is any deep issue of
principle at stake here. He is, rather, expressing a highly pragmatic
concern with keeping the rules for individuals as uncomplicated as
possible.
It is worth drawing attention to one other aspect of the argument
that Rawls makes in the passage quoted in the preceding paragraph.
He begins with the assumption that constraints of corrective justice
are already in place and then argues that, for pragmatic reasons, we
require special institutions of distributive justice. But Ripstein's
argument seems to have a different structure. He begins with
distributive principles and then argues that the related ideas of having
one's fair share and being responsible for how one's own life goes
require special institutions of corrective justice. If I have understood
him correctly, Ripstein's argument in fact goes beyond this claim
about institutions. He also maintains that the content of corrective
justice, which he takes to be coextensive with the requirements of
33. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 267. Notice that Rawls does not
himself use the term "corrective justice." But he clearly has in mind the concept of
interpersonal justice, which comes to the same thing. While Rawls's discussion
focuses on contract law, most of what he has to say carries over fairly readily to the
law of torts.
34. Id. at 267-68.
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traditional deontological theory, can itself be derived from these
ideas. There is, however, much to be said for the order of explanation
proposed by Rawls. It suggests that corrective justice, understood as a
set of deontological constraints, is normatively and conceptually prior
to distributive justice. There is, on this view, no need to derive those
constraints by means of a consequentialist argument that begins with
the idea of having one's fair share. Rather the principles of
distributive justice, and hence the meaning of having a fair share, must
conform to the pre-political principles of corrective justice. How, it
might be asked, can the content of deontological constraints be
specified in the absence of defined entitlements to resources? In
responding to this question it is natural to suggest that the foundation
of such constraints must reside in the inviolability of the person or
some similar notion.35 When distributive justice enters the picture, the
constraints are extended to fair shares of external resources and help
to define the conceptual boundaries of such shares.36 I believe that
this general understanding of the relationship between corrective and
distributive justice informs, at least implicitly, much contemporary
deontological theorizing. To say anything more about these very
fundamental matters is, however, well beyond the scope of this Essay.
35. Cf F.M. Kamm, Nonconsequentialism, in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical
Theory 205, 217 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000). Another possibility is, of course, Kant's
own argument for a principle of equal right. The relationship between the right to be
secure in one's person and the right to property is a controversial issue in Kantian
scholarship, and cannot be discussed here. For differing views on this question, see
Paul Guyer, Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right, in Kant: Metaphysics of
Morals (Mark Timmons ed., 2000), and Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, supra note
28, at 11-14. In the article under discussion in this Essay, Ripstein argues as follows:
[Tihe division of responsibility mandates that we treat each person as free to
do as he or she sees fit with the means at his or her disposal, that is, to use
both bodily powers and income and wealth in pursuit of his or her own
conception of the good, in a way consistent with others having the same
freedom to pursue their conception of the good. All of this is done within a
broader framework of redistributive institutions, the other half of the
division of responsibility. Personal powers and property are alike in their
significance to the claims of other private parties, and so subject to a parallel
treatment in tort.
Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1836. Personal powers and property may well be alike in
this respect, but that is quite consistent with the idea that integrity of the person has
moral priority over property rights and that the reason these interests are subject to a
parallel treatment in tort is that property rights receive protection similar to those
accorded to security of the person. I take Ripstein to be suggesting, in effect, that the
argument goes in the other direction: Security of the person is protected because
bodily powers are, like property rights, means for pursuing a conception of the good.
It is perhaps worth remarking in this regard that Rawls treats integrity of the person
as falling under the first principle of justice (the principle of equal liberty), while
property falls under the difference principle, which is part of the second principle. See
John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q.J. Econ. 633, 640 (1974). The
first principle has, of course, lexical priority over the second.
36. Cf Perry, supra note 4, at 253-63.
Notes & Observations
